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I. INTRODUCTION
Last year, my only prediction was that the Supreme Court would
reverse the decision in Defenders of Willife, Friends ofAnimals and
Their Environment v. Lujan,1 where the Eighth Circuit held that (1)
the organizational plaintiffs had standing to challenge a governmental
regulation,2 and (2) the governmental regulation, which provided
that government agencies funding projects in foreign countries did
not need to consult with the Secretary of the Interior about their
projects' impact upon endangered species in the affected foreign
countries, was inconsistent with the Endangered Species Act.3 As I
noted, the Court could reverse either by finding no standing or by
finding in favor of the government on the merits.4 The Supreme
Court reversed on the standing issue and therefore had no need to
reach the merits. 5
Justice Clarence Thomas had just been confirmed by the Senate
shortly before this Article went to press last year. As I noted then, all
indications were that Thomas "will most often join Justice Scalia,
thereby solidifying the extreme right wing of the Court."6 This
1. 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cit. 1990).
2. Id at 122.
3. IM at 125.
4. J. Clark Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term and Preview of the 1991-92
Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 4 "IRANSNATL LAw. 391, 407-15 (1991).
5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
6. Kelso, supra note 4, at 416.
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prediction has also come true, with Justices Thomas and Scalia
voting together in 89% of the cases.7
1I. ExEcuTVE SUMMARY
A. Organizational Group Lacked Standing to Challenge Regulations
Regarding Environmental Impact of United States Projects
Overseas
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,8 the Court held that the
plaintiffs did not establish an "injury in fact" for Article I standing
purposes when the plaintiffs' affidavits did not indicate specifically
when the plaintiffs intended to return to overseas sites where
government projects were threatening to harm endangered species.
A generalized statement that the plaintiffs intended to return to such
sites sometime in the future was held inadequate as a matter of law.
The Court also held that the citizen suit standing provision of Section
1 (g) of the Endangered Species Act could not constitutionally
authorize "any person" to bring suit for governmental noncompliance
with the Act because such a broad standing provision would violate
Separation of Powers by requiring the Judicial Branch to see that the
laws are properly executed, a governmental function explicitly
entrusted to the Executive Branch.
Among other things, the decision is significant to transnational
businesses and foreign governments who are seeking U.S.
government development aid. The decision will make it much more
difficult for U.S. environmental groups to block such overseas
development projects through an extraterritorial application of U.S.
environmental laws.
7. Voting Alignments on the Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term, TH) NAT'LLJ., Aug. 31, 1992,
at S2.
8. 112 S. CL 2130 (1992).
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B. Financing Governmental Operations and the Commercial
Activity Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc.,9 the Court held that
a New York District Court had jurisdiction under the commercial
activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
adjudicate a claim arising out of Argentina's default on bonds which
were sold by Argentina in an effort to stabilize its fluctuating
currency. The decision is a welcome one to international lenders and
monetary markets which can operate efficiently in financing
government operations only if financial instruments are enforceable
in such leading money markets as New York.
C. Forcible Abduction of Criminals Overseas Does Not Bar
Prosecution in United States Courts
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,0 the Court held that the
extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States was not
violated when the U.S. authorized the successful kidnapping of a
Mexican national from Mexico to the U.S. for the sole purpose of
prosecuting that person in a U.S. court. The decision recognizes that
extradition treaties are only one way by which one country may gain
personal jurisdiction over a person located in a foreign country and
that U.S. courts will ordinarily not inquire as to how a particular
defendant came to be brought into the U.S. Such matters, says the
Court, are a matter for the Executive Branch and for diplomatic
negotiations.
When this decision is combined with United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez," which held that the search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search of a foreign national's
home overseas, it becomes clear just how much power the Executive
Branch has in conducting extraterritorial investigations. Their
investigatory power overseas far exceeds their domestic power.
9. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
11. 110 S. CL 1056 (1990).
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Operating a criminal enterprise overseas which has effects in the U.S.
is a risky business.12
Ill. REVIEW OF THE 1991-92 TERM
A. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife - Organizational Group Lacked
Standing to Challenge Regulations Regarding United States
Projects Overseas
With the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,13
the U.S. established itself as a world leader in the fight to preserve
vanishing wildlife. 14 The Act directed the Secretary of the Interior
to create what is commonly known as the Endangered Species
List,15 and species appearing on that list are accorded extraordinary
protection from harm. 6
Section 7(a) of the Act provides that "[e]ach Federal agency shall,
in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency..
is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species .... 17 The Department of the Interior
in the Carter Administration enacted a regulation which required
federal agencies to consult with the Secretary concerning actions in
12. It is somewhat ironic that persons engaged in an international criminal enterprise might
be well advised to locate that enterprise within the United States in order to trigger various
constitutional protections.
13. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988)).
14. According to the Court, the Act is "the most comprehensive legislation for the presevation
of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
180 (1978).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
16. The Act contains a long list of prohibited conduct regarding endangered species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538. To give merely a taste of the breadth of the Act's proscriptions, it is contrary to the Act "for
any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to import or export any endangered
species or to "take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States
... or upon the high seas." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(1). According to 16 U.S.C. § 1532, "take* means to
harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). There are, of course, certain statutory exceptions to the application
of this provision. National security interests, for example, override the obligation created by Section
7(a). 16 U.S.C. § 15360).
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foreign countries."S The Reagan Administration changed course,
however, and enacted a regulation which limited the consultation
obligation to actions "in the United States or upon the high seas."
19
In 1986, the Defenders of Wildlife filed suit against the then-
Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, challenging the validity of
the regulatory change as contrary to Section 7(a) of the Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit struck down the
regulation, holding that the organizational plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the regulation and that the regulation was contrary to
Section 7(a).2' The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
consider two important questions: First, do the plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the regulations? Second, if the plaintiffs do
have standing, is the regulation consistent with Section 7(a) of the
Act?
The Court did not have to reach the second question upon which
it granted review because the plaintiffs did not satisfy Article III
standing requirements. The law of standing is one of the most
complex and subtle fields known to the federal bench and bar, and
has been a favorite topic for commentators and scholars.21
The plaintiff in the case was an organization, the Defenders of
Wildlife, which had sued on behalf of its members. It is well accepted
that an organization may sue either because of injuries to itself or
because of certain kinds of injuries to its members. In cases where the
organization sues on behalf of its members, the organization must
satisfy a three-part test: (a) The members must "otherwise have
18. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1978).
19. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1986).
20. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals and TheirEnvironment v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117,
125 (8th Cir. 1990).
21. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
JURISDICION 2d, §§ 3531-3531.16 (1984). See also Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and
Judicial Review after Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18
EcOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L REv. 1239 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RLv. 1432 (1988); William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YAm L.J. 221 (1988); Michael A. Perino, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental
Law, and the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENvrL. AP. L. REv. 135 (1987); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine
of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L REv. 881 (1983);
Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L REV. 4 (1982).
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standing to sue in their own right;" (b) the interests at stake in the suit
are "germane to the organization's purpose;" and (c) "neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires participation of
individual members in the lawsuit." 2
Defenders of Wildlife easily satisfied the second and third prongs
of this test. The interests at stake, protection of endangered species,
were plainly germane to the organization's purpose, and the relief
sought, a judgment declaring invalid a federal regulation, did not
require participation by any organization members. The question,
then, was whether any of the members of the organization could
prove "standing to sue in their own right."
Several organization members submitted affidavits which
attempted to establish that they would suffer some injury as a result
of the regulatory change, an injury that would give the members a
sufficiently concrete interest in the dispute to satisfy Article III
requirements. Ms. Joyce Kelly, for example, stated that she had
previously visited Egypt to observe the endangered Nile crocodile,
that she intended to make another such visit in the future, and that she
would be harmed by the American involvement in developing a dam
on the Nile and in developing Egypt's Master Water Plan.23 Ms.
Amy Skilbred, another member, declared that she had previously
visited Sri Lanka to observe the endangered Asian elephant and the
endangered leopard, that a project funded by the Agency for
International Development would threaten those species (and others),
and that she intended to return to Sri Lanka sometime in the future to
view the endangered species.24 Although Kelly and Skilbred stated
that they were concerned that threats to endangered species would
injure them in the future, neither Kelly nor Skilbred indicated that
they had any concrete plans to visit either country to see the
endangered species in the immediate future.' Instead, both had only
an intention to visit these countries sometime in the future.
22. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). See
generally ERWIN CHMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.7, pp. 89-90 (1989).
23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. CL 2130, 2138 (1992).
24. Id
25. Id
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The Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, held that the affidavits
did not satisfy Article III standing requirements. Article III limits the
power of the U.S. judiciary to resolving "cases" or
"controversies. " 26 The standing doctrine-which is one of several
doctrines used by the Court to insure that it has before it a case or
controversy-focuses generally upon whether the plaintiff has
suffered an injury at the hands of the defendant which a court can
redress. More particularly, as reiterated in Defenders of Wildlife, the
plaintiff must satisfy the following test:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of
a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized.., and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or hypothetical."... Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." ... Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will
be "redressed by a favorable decision." 27
Beginning with the decision in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),28 courts in
environmental injury cases have often accepted relatively general
allegations of injury-in-fact of precisely the sort submitted by the
plaintiff in Defenders of Wildlife. The Supreme Court's retreat from
this rather loose approach to standing began with its decision two
years ago in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,29 where the
Court denied standing to an environmental group when the affidavits
on standing alleged "only that one of respondent's members uses
unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some
portions of which mining activity has occurred or probably will occur
by virtue of the governmental action."3" National Wildlife
Federation arose on a Rule 56(e) motion for summary judgment, and
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 1.
27. 112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).
28. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
29. 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
30. Id at 3189.
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the Court distinguished its prior (and seemingly contrary) holding in
SCRAP on the ground that SCRAP arose on a Rule 12(b) motion to
dismiss.3" Although this distinction was technically a valid one,32
it suggested that the Court was not firmly committed to SCRAP's
broad view of standing.
The Court's decision this term in Defenders of Wildlife confirms
that SCRAP, living up to its name, has been effectively consigned to
the garbage pile (although the Court did not have the good grace
expressly to overrule SCRAP and even cited SCRAP in support of its
decision).33 The affidavits presented by the plaintiffs were, in one
sense, more specific than the affidavits found insufficient in National
Wildlife Federation. The plaintiffs specifically stated that they had
visited a specific site in a foreign country and that they intended to
return to that site in the future.
That was not enough for the Court, however. The Court held that
an intent to return to the site did not prove a sufficiently "imminent"
injury to satisfy the first prong of the three-part standing inquiry:
"Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of concrete
plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will
be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that
our cases require." 34
As both the concurring and dissenting opinions point out, it
would appear that the plaintiffs could satisfy the Court's test simply
by providing the Court with a specific travel itinerary.35 Yet there
may be more to Scalia's opinion than the mere formality which it
seems to require. More generally, Scalia's opinion for the Court
suggests a tightening of the Court's three-pronged standing inquiry,
and such a tightening could have important ramifications.
31. Id
32. On a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, the court is required to draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the non-moving party. This means, among other things, "that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." 110 S.Ct. at 3189. Rule 56(e), by
contrast, requires the non-moving party to submit affidavits or other evidence which "set[s] forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." F.R.C.P. 56(e) (emphasis added).
33. 112 S. Ct. at 2139.
34. I& at 2138 (emphasis in original).
35. 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 112 S. Ct. at 2153 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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The potential impact of this possible tightening can be clearly
seen in Part I1I-B of Scalia's opinion, which was joined by only three
other justices (and thus only a plurality opinion). In Part Ill-B, Scalia
indicates that the affidavits also failed to show that it was "likely" the
plaintiff's alleged injury could be redressed by a judicial order. The
plaintiff sued only the Secretary of the Interior. According to Scalia,
the failure to name as defendants the heads of other departments
which actually were funding foreign projects made it impossible for
the courts to render complete relief (namely, an order requiring the
termination of funding until consultation occurs).,6 Scalia rejected
as unwarranted the suggestion that the trial court's determination in
a suit against the Secretary of the Interior, that other agencies had a
legal obligation to consult with the Secretary on such projects would
constitute sufficient redressability to satisfy Article III
requirements.37 One could also imagine, although Scalia did not
address this issue in his opinion, that the affidavits failed to
demonstrate that the predicted harm to endangered species was
"fairly traceable" to U.S. Government conduct, as opposed to the
conduct of other nations or parties who were building in the sensitive
areas.
The danger in requiring the sort of specificity which Scalia seems
to think is necessary is that the merits of the case end up being
litigated on the threshhold issue of standing. After all, the three-
pronged test encompasses the issues of injury, causation, and remedy.
If a plaintiff must prove all of these elements in order to satisfy the
Article III standing rules, it would seem that the only issue left for the
merits is a determination of liability or breach by the defendant.
We have reason to hope that a majority of the Court will not
follow Scalia down this path. Although Justices Kennedy and Souter
joined Scalia's opinion insofar as it held that the affidavits did not
specifically set forth a return trip to the affected areas, Scalia lost
their support (and with it, the crucial fifth vote) when it came to
36. 112 S. Ct. at 2141-42.
37. 112 S.Ct. at 2141.
612
1992 / Review of the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term
redressability.38 This may suggest that Kennedy's and Souter's
views on standing are not quite as rigid as Scalia's.
39
Having held that the plaintiffs did not suffer any concrete injury-
in-fact, the Court turned to the argument that standing existed by
virtue of a "procedural injury" under the citizen standing provision
of the Endangered Species Act. According to Section 11(g) of the
Act, "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf - (A)
to enjoin any person, including the United States... who is alleged
to be in violation of any provision of this chapter."40 Applied
literally, this section appears to authorize "any person"-whether or
not they have suffered actual injury-in-fact- to file a lawsuit against
a violator of the Act. Because the standing doctrine is rooted in the
Article II case or controversy requirement, Section 11(g) squarely
presented the issue whether Congress may, by statute, grant standing
to a person who has suffered no injury.
Viewing the case or controversy requirement as one aspect of the
Separation of Powers principle, a majority of the Court held that
Congress could not create standing in a person who has suffered no
injury-in-fact to challenge the Executive Branch's compliance with
an act of Congress. Such a statute would not only undermine the case
or controversy requirement, but it would also upset the balance
between the Executive and Judicial Branches. As Scalia explained,
38. Scalia also had rejected the plaintiffs' argument that standing existed under either an
"ecosystem nexus" theory, "animal nexus" theory, or "vocational nexus" theory. 112 S. Ct. at 2139.
Under these broad nexus theories, the plaintiffs would not have been required to establish that they
were planning to visit a specific foreign site. Instead, the plaintiffs' interest in the dispute would be
established by some other aspect of the plaintiffs' lives, such as their use of any part of a contiguous
ecosystem, their general interest in animals, or a professional interest in animals. Scalia rejected these
theories as a matter of law. Although Justices Kennedy and Souter agreed that the facts in the case
did not support standing under any of these theories, Kennedy and Souter did not foreclose the
possibility that in another case, the nexus theories might be appropriately invoked. 112 S. Ct. at 2146
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Justices Kennedy's and Souter's view of the standing requirement may be interpreted as
different from Justice Scalia's in one of two ways. First, Kennedy and Souter may merely accept a
broader definition of "imminent injury," the frst prong of the three-part standing inquiry. Or, second,
Kennedy and Souter may continue to view standing as only a threshhold inquiry rather than an
inquiry that takes the court into the merits of the dispute. In contrast, Justice Scalia seems to require
that the "imminent injury" aspect of the standing requirement is met only when a plaintiff
demonstrates (at the pleading stage) an injury that would only be required by Kennedy and Souter
during the merits stage of the dispute.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
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"[tio permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest
in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual
right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' 41
B. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover -Application of the
Commercial Activity Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunites Act
Holding a foreign nation accountable in a U.S. court is a direct
challenge to that foreign nation's sovereignty. The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) recognizes this reality and provides
that "foreign state[s] shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the U.S. and of the States."42 There are a number of
exceptions to this immunity, however, the most important of which
is the "commercial activity" exception. 43 This statutory exception
is consistent with general principles of international law, which
recognize that suits against a nation arising out of that nation's
commercial activities do not pose the same threat to sovereignty as
would a suit against a sovereign arising out of purely governmental
activities.'
Section 1603(d) of the FSIA defines "commercial activity" as
follows:
A "comercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
41. 112 S. Ct. at 2145. See 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I agree that it
would exceed [Article EII] limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing
of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen-suits to vindicate the publlcs nonconcrete interest in
the proper administration of the laws").
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
44. The restrictivetheory ofimmun ty, which is accepted world-wide, provides for sovereign
immunity "except with respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on
by private person." Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 451.
Commercial activities are the most significant activities which fall within this recognized exception.
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the Untied States, § 453.
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character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose.
4 5
The issue in Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc. was whether
a nation's decision to default on bonds that had been issued as part of
a program to stabilize that nation's currency was a "commercial
activity." On the one hand, when a nation attempts to manage and
stabilize its currency, it would seem to be performing an important
governmental function. On the other hand, issuing and satisfying (or
not satisfying) bonds is an activity routinely engaged in by private
persons in the commercial market.
The dispute in Republic ofArgentina can be traced to Argentina's
efforts during the 1980's to solve a serious foreign exchange
problem. Because Argentina's currency is not accepted on the
international market, Argentine businesses wishing to participate in
the international market must pay in U.S. dollars (or some other
accepted currency). However, these businesses had difficulty
obtaining U.S. dollars, in part because the instability of Argentina's
currency made it difficult to secure loans in U.S. dollars. To address
this problem, in 1981 Argentina created a foreign exchange insurance
contract program, pursuant to which the government assumed the risk
of currency fluctuations in international transactions.46
In 1982, it became clear that Argentina did not possess sufficient
reserves of U.S. dollars to finance the program. It then adopted
various emergency measures, including the issuance of government
bonds to creditors, payable in U.S. dollars on the London, Frankfurt,
Zurich, or New York markets (at the creditor's election). By 1986, it
again became clear that Argentina lacked sufficient foreign exchange
to retire the bonds as they came due. By presidential decree,
Argentina unilaterally extended the due dates of the bonds and
offered bondholders substitute instruments to reschedule the debts.
The plaintiffs in the case refused the substitute instrument, insisted
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
46. 112 S. Ct. at 2163.
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on full payment in New York, and then filed suit in New York when
Argentina defaulted. 47
It is plain enough that the issuance of the bonds and the
subsequent presidential decree were actions which fulfilled an
important governmental (rather than private) purpose. But the FSIA
explicitly provides that it is the "nature" of the activity and not its
purpose which determines whether it is commercial. 48 Focusing
solely upon the nature of the activity, 4 9 a unanimous Court
determined that the issuance of bonds constituted a "commercial
activity." As the Court correctly noted, the bonds "are in almost all
respects garden-variety debt instruments: they may be held by private
parties; they are negotiable and may be traded on the international
market (except in Argentina); and they promise a future stream of
cash income."5" Accordingly, jurisdiction was properly asserted in
the Southern District of New York.
The result in this case should be of obvious importance to the
transnational practitioner. The possibility that a foreign government
may unilaterally change the terms of a contract or debt instrument
makes dealing with foreign governments a risky business. If foreign
governments engaged in commercial activities can be held to account
in a U.S. forum, those risks can be reduced to a tolerable level, which
will in turn promote greater commercial dealings between the private
sector and foreign governments.
C. United States v. Alvarez-Machain - Government Sponsored
Kidnapping of a Foreign National Does Not Bar Criminal Trial
of that National in United States Courts
Two terms ago, the Court held in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search of
47. 112 S. Ct. at 2164.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
49. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the "nature" of an activity at times could
be understood only by considering its -purpose,- a position taken by at least one federal court. Do
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985). According to the
Court, "this line of argument is squarely foreclosed by the language of the FSIA." Republic of
Argentina, 112 S. Ct. at 2167.
50. 112 S. Ct. at 2166.
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an alien's home outside of the U.S. notwithstanding the participation
of United States government agents in the search."1 This term, the
Court held in United States v. Alvarez-Machain that U.S. courts had
jurisdiction to prosecute a foreign national whose presence in the
U.S. was the result of a kidnapping in which U.S. agents
participated.52
Both of these extraordinary cases arose out of the same incident,
the kidnap and murder in Mexico of a Drug Enforcement
Administration special agent and his Mexican pilot. Verdugo-
Urquidez was believed to be one of the leaders of a large drug
operation operating out of Mexico and was believed to have
participated in the kidnap and murder of the special agent.53
Alvarez-Machain, a physician, allegedly participated in the murder
by prolonging the special agent's life, thereby giving others the
opportunity further to torture and interrogate him.54
The U.S. Government's reaction included (1) the warrantless
search of Verdugo-Urquidez's home in Mexico, which was upheld in
United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez, and (2) the U.S. government
authorized kidnapping of Alvarez-Machain in order to bring him into
the U.S., where he was arrested. The narrow issue before the Court
inAlvarez-Machain was whether a government authorized abduction
of a Mexican citizen to the U.S. from Mexico violated the extradition
treaty between the U.S. and Mexico, thereby depriving a U.S. court
of jurisdiction over the defendant.5
51. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). See J. Clark Kelso, Review ofthe Supreme Court's 1989-90 Term
and Preview of the 1990-91 Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAWYER 393,
405-10 (1990).
52. 112 S. CL 2188 (1992).
53. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
490 U.S. 1019, revd, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
54. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
55. The district court had rejected the defendant's due process claim that the indictment must
be dismissed because of "outrageous governmental conduct." 112 S. Ct. at 2190. The district court
held that the kidnapping violated the extradition treaty, and the government appealed. Id. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, and the government sought a writ of certiorari, which was granted. 112 S. Ct. at
2190-91. Whether the kidnapping violated the extradition treaty was, accordingly, the only issue
before the Court.
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According to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,5 6 the courts will
ordinarily not inquire as to the method by which a criminal defendant
was brought before the court. In both Ker and Frisbie, the defendant
had been kidnapped from a foreign jurisdiction,57 and in both cases,
the court held that jurisdiction existed notwithstanding the
kidnapping." Once the U.S. has invoked an extradition treaty,
however, it must follow the procedures set forth in that treaty, and a
treaty violation divests the court of its jurisdiction. So, for example,
in United States v. Rauscher,59 the court held that the applicable
extradition treaty prohibited the government from prosecuting the
defendant for a crime other than the crime for which he had been
extradited, and the court ordered the defendant released.
The extradition treaty between the U.S. and Mexico was silent on
the question of whether one country could forcibly abduct another
country's nationals as a way of obtaining jurisdiction over that
person, or, more generally, whether the extradition treaty provided
the exclusive method by which one country could assert jurisdiction
over another country's nationals. The majority of the Court believed
that the treaty's silence indicated the limits of the treaty. As the Court
noted, "[e]xtradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations
to surrender individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances,
following established procedures."' It is therefore not possible for
a country which has not invoked the extradition treaty to have
violated the procedures established by the treaty, even if the country
56. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
57. In Ker, the defendant was kidnapped by private persons from Peru and brought into the
U.S. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. CL at 2192. In Frisbie, the defendant was kidnapped in Chicago by
Michigan police officers and brought to trial in Michigan. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192.
58. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine has become a favorite topic for the law reviews. Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, U.S. Law EnforcementAbroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 880 (1989); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad. The Constitution and
International Law, Continue, 84 AM. J. Iln'L L. 444 (1990); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by
Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. . INT'L L 712 (1990); H. Moss Crystle, Note, Fighting
the War on Drugs in the 'New World Order: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine As A Products of its Time,
24 VAND. . TRANSNAT'L L. 535 (1991); Note, International 'Fugitive Snatching' in U.S. Law: Two
Viewsfrom Opposite Ends ofthe Eighties, 24 CoRNELL INT'L LJ. 521 (1991); Andrew B. Campbell,
Note, When Rights Fall in a Forest... The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and America's Judicial
Countenance of ExtraterritorialAbduction and Torture, 9 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 387 (1991).
59. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
60. 112 S. CL at 2194.
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has otherwise violated international norms. Because the treaty was
not violated, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine applied, and the court would
not inquire further into the method by which the defendant was made
to appear.
The dissenters interpreted the treaty's comprehensive provisions
dealing with extradition, and the silence with respect to prohibiting
forcible abductions, to include an implied term prohibiting one
country from violating the other's territorial sovereignty in
circumstances that would appear to have called for invocation of the
treaty. That is, the dissenters believed that the treaty's comprehensive
regulation of the extradition process indicated an intent that the treaty
be the sole basis for one government gaining personal jurisdiction
over citizens located in another country.61
In purely abstract terms, the dissenters may have had the better
argument. Why would two countries bother agreeing to a
comprehensive set of procedures regarding extradition if either
country could simply ignore the procedures at will? The answer
would seem to be that diplomacy involves more than just explicit
agreements between sovereigns. With some regularity, the U.S.
government receives requests from a "host" country not to request
extradition of a criminal but, instead, to use other means outside of
the extradition treaty (referred to as "irregular rendition").62 This
informal procedure saves the host country from having to accede
publicly to a U.S. demand for extradition while at the the same time
not offending the U.S. government by refusing to cooperate. This
practice strongly suggests that extradition treaties are widely
recognized as not being the sole basis for securing the presence of the
defendant.
Although the decision inAlvarez-Machain appears to put the U.S.
courts on record as supporting government authorized kidnapping,
the majority of the Court was essentially trying to put the ball back
in the Executive Branch's court without necessarily approving the
61. 112 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
62. Abraham Abramovsky, ExtraterritorialAbductions. America's 'Catch and Snatch' Policy
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 155-56 (1991); Proceedings, Strengthening the Rule of Law in
the War Against Drugs and Narco-Terrorism, 15 NOVA L REV. 795, 851 (1991).
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"snatch and catch" policy. In that regard, the court highlighted "[t]he
advantage of the diplomatic approach to the resolution of difficulties
between two sovereign nations, as opposed to unilateral action by the
courts of one nation.... 63 In other words, defendants should not
expect the courts to come to their aid in these circumstances. Instead,
defendants should contact their former host country and seek relief
through diplomatic channels.
IV. PREVIEW OF THE 1992-93 TERM
A. Nelson v. Saudi Arabia - When is an Action "Based Upon"
Commercial Activity Within the United States for Purposes of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In Republic ofArgentina v. Weltover, Inc.," the issue was
whether the issuance of bonds constituted a "commercial activity"
notwithstanding that the purpose of the bonds was to stabilize
Argentina's currency. In Nelson v. Saudi Arabia,65 the Court will
determine what it means for an action against a foreign sovereign to
be "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state.' ' 6
Scott Nelson, the plaintiff, answered a printed advertisement in
the United States recruiting employees for the King Faisal Specialist
Hospital located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The recuiting company,
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), had been previously hired
by the Royal Cabinet of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to recruit
employees for the hospital. After visiting the hospital in Riyadh,
Nelson returned to the United States and signed the employment
contract in Miami, Florida. He and his wife then moved to Riyadh to
begin work. Nelson alleges that in the course of performing his duties
as a monitoring systems engineer, he discovered safety hazards which
he reported to an investigative commission of the Saudi government.
63. 112 S. Ct. at 2196 n.16.
64. 112 S. CL 2160 (1992).
65. 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. granted 112 S. Ct. 2937 (June 8, 1992).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
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In retaliation for his whistleblowing, Nelson allegedly was
imprisoned and tortured by government agents for 39 days, and his
wife was told by a government official that Nelson could be released
if she provided sexual favors. 67
Nelson and his wife filed suit against Saudi Arabia, the hospital,
and another government-owned business, Royspec, in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The District Court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that HCA's recruitment activities were
insufficiently connected with the defendants' conduct to satisfy the
requirement that the foreign sovereign's commercial activity have
"substantial contact" with the U.S. and that the action was not "based
upon" any commercial activity within the U.S. 68 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed.
The Eleventh Circuit rather easily found that HCA was an agent
of the Saudi government for purposes of recruitment and hiring
within the United States. The court could not have concluded
otherwise. The contract between HCA and the Saudi government
gave HCA power to recruit and employ medical personnel on behalf
of the hospital, to set initial salaries, to supervise such employees,
and to terminate the employment of such employees.6 The contract
expressly identified HCA "as agent" for the Saudi government for
purposes of executing written employment contracts in the United
States.7" Since HCA was the Saudi government's agent, the court
concluded, quite properly, that the recruitment activities were a
"commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
state."
71
The more difficult issue is whether the plaintiffs' "action is based
upon" the recruitment activities. The complaint alleges that "'[tihe
arbitrary prolonged detention and the physical torture of Mr. Nelson
... is based directly upon the recruitment activity carried on in the
67. All of these facts are taken from the court of appears opinion, 923 F.2d at 1530.
68. 923 F.2d at 1530. (quoting Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, No. 88-1791, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 11, 1989)).
69. 923 F.2d at 1533.
70. Id.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988).
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United States by agents of Saudi Arabia."' 72 The issue is whether
this characterization of the action satisfies the "based upon"
requirement contained in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
Courts have identified four different interpretations of the "based
upon" requirement." Some courts have adopted a "literal"
approach, interpreting "based upon" to mean precisely what it
appears to mean: that the cause of action arises directly out of
commercial activity carried on in the U.S.74 Other courts have
adopted a "nexus" approach, in which the commercial activity must
only have some "connection" to the act complained of in the suit.75
A third group of courts--apparently unable to choose between the first
two approaches-have applied a bifurcated literal and nexus
approach.7 6 Finally, a fourth group have fashioned a "doing
business" approach which requires that a broad course of commercial
conduct within the U.S. be connected to the act complained of in the
suit. 7
7
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the most liberal approach, the nexus
test, which requires only some loose connection between the acts
complained of and the commercial activity. Under that approach, the
Eleventh Circuit found that "the detention and torture of Nelson are
so intertwined with his employment at the Hospital that they are
'based upon' his recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for
employment at the Hospital in Saudi Arabia." 78
I predict the Supreme Court will reverse the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. The key to the court of appeals' decision was the conclusion
that a claim is "based upon" commercial activity of a foreign state
when there exists a "jurisdictional nexus" between the commercial
72. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1533.
73. Veneedor Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation,
730 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1984).
74. For a discussion and rejection of the -literal" approach, see Gibbons v. Udaras Na
Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1109 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
75. Velidor v. LPG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 929
(1982); Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine
Kulilmann, 853 F.2d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 1988).
76. Navigacion, 730 F.2d at 200.
77. Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
78. Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1535.
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activity and the acts for which damages are sought.79 The Supreme
Court should reject the jurisdictional nexus approach. Congress did
not use the words "jurisdictional nexus" in the Act; Congress used
the phrase "based upon." An action that only has some connection
with commercial activity is not the same thing as an action that is
based upon that commercial activity. If Congress had intended "some
connection" to be the standard, Congress could just as readily have
used those words instead of the phrase "based upon."
Anyone familiar with the Court's recent jurisprudence on
statutory interpretation will at once recognize that the analysis just set
forth is consistent with (indeed, virtually commanded by) the "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation that a majority of the
Court appears to have adopted."0 Under the plain meaning approach,
the court first determines whether the statutory language is
ambiguous; if it is not ambiguous, then there is no need to look
further into the legislative history. Only if there is ambiguity may the
court consult other indicia of the legislative intent.
That a claim be "based upon" a commercial activity would not
seem to be a particularly ambiguous requirement. A claim is "based
upon" a particular activity when the claim arises out of that activity
(as opposed to some other connected activity). Indeed, the plain
meaning is so clear, that courts which have rejected this meaning are
forced to use a different phrase entirely, "jurisdictional nexus," to
achieve the desired results.
But even if one consults the legislative history, one finds that
Congress chose the phrase "based upon" very deliberately. The
second clause of § 1605(a)(2) provides for jurisdiction in actions
"based... upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere."81 The
House Judiciary Committee Report explained that this clause applies
in circumstances where "a claim arises out of a specific act in the
United States which is commercial or private in nature and which
79. Id. at 1534.
80. L Clark Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 Term and Preview of the 1991-92
Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 391, 395-96 (1991).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1989).
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relates to a commercial activity abroad."' The Report also indicates
that "the acts (or omissions) encompassed in this category are limited
to those which in and of themselves are sufficient to form the basis
of a cause of action." 3
Like the second clause of § 1605(a)(2), the first clause requires
that the action be "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state."84 Some might argue that
interpreting "based upon" to mean "arises out of" in the first clause
would make the first and second clauses essentially overlap in their
coverage. What is the difference between an action that arises out of
commercial activity in the United States and an action that arises out
of acts in the United States that are connected to a commercial
activity abroad?
There are two responses to this argument. First, Congress realized
that there would be a significant or total overlap between the first and
second clauses and decided to include the second clause for the sake
of clarity." Second, the first clause would apply to a commercial
activity carried on in the United States even if the actionable acts
(e.g., beating and torture) took place in a foreign country; the second
clause would plainly not apply to this situation.86
82. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (Sept. 9, 1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6618. (emphasis added).
83. lM.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1989).
85. The House Report indicates that "[a]lthough some or all of these acts [under the second
clause] might also be considered to be a 'commercial activity carried on in the United States,' as
broadly defined in section 1603(e), it has seemed advisable to provide expressly for the case where
a claim arises out of a specific act in the United States which is commercial or private in nature and
which relates to a commercial activity abroad." H.R. Rep No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 19
(Sept. 9, 1076), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6604, 6618. (emphasis added).
86. Under this interpretation, if the Saudi government's commercial activity was defined as
running a hospital, and that activity could be found to be carried on in the U.S., then the Nelsons'
claims would plainly be "based upon" the government's activity of running the hospital. The Nelsons'
difficulty with this argument, however, is that the operation of the Saudi hospital did not have
"substantial contact with the United States." It appears that the only contact with the U.S. was the
recruitment and hiring of some employees, and the Eleventh Circuit found only the recruitment and
hiring to be a commercial activity carried on in the U.S. 923 F.2d 1528, 1533 (1991).
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In light of the plain meaning of the phrase "based upon" and the
supporting legislative history, which confirms that Congress chose its
words carefully in this context, the Supreme Court is very likely to
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
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